Es ist in der Tat nicht einfach die Artikel zu finden und ich habe mehrere nicht gefunden, die ich meinte. Dennoch sind einige Artikel unten, die den Kern der Sache treffen. Zwar weniger explizit in einigen Fällen, als in anderen, aber European Council Papiere formulieren anders als Spiegel. Ich habe aus den Links Zitate herauskopiert. Das bedeutet nicht, dass das die einzig relevanten Stellen im Text sind.
Leider finde ich momentan die Quotes der Regierungen Kanadas, Hollands und Australiens nicht. Ich werde das noch versuchen zu finden.
"“For decades, we Germans have benefited from the fact that our partners gave us the feeling of reliable security,”Thomas de Maizière"
“Germany is back in the game as one of the most important countries in the Western Hemisphere, but the kind of responsibility that goes with that is not really reflected in German government behavior,” said Olaf Böhnke, head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “If Germany wants to be in a leadership position, you need stronger military engagement.”....I don’t think it’s healthy for the future of Europe to give Germany this refuge where Germany handles the economy and doesn’t have to deal with the dirty stuff,” Mr. Böhnke said."
"Officials at the nerve center of the Western defense alliance have even coined the term "Germany feeling," to express the notion that everything Germany does for the alliance is either "too little or too late.""
"The Germans are no longer being as rudely berated as in 2006, when a member of the British House of Commons, speaking at a meeting of NATO parliamentarians in Quebec, sharply criticized the Germans' role in Afghanistan, saying: "Some drink tea and beer, while others risk their lives." "
"During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Germany received international criticism for its unwillingness to assume a role proportionate to its military power and political importance."
Ulrike Guérot, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, argued that in retrospect, German abstention from the UN resolution authorising intervention, and its decision not to take part in operations, was a mistake.
""While its closest partners and allies embrace and nurse their commitment to the doctrine of responsibility to protect, Germany still likes to think of itself in terms of that bigger version of Switzerland. But this simply does not work for Europe as a whole," Guérot wrote."
"A few months ago, former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine complained that Westerwelle expresses the "profound German attitude" that Germany primarily sees itself as a pacifist power. "I really don't see what prevents Germany from playing a larger role in international politics and military operations," he said. The current French government takes precisely the same view."
""As is usually the case these days, Germany … is keeping its head down," wrote the British daily Guardian last week. Westerwelle's "mealy-mouthed statements leave a bad taste," commented the newspaper."
"Westerwelle is convinced that the credo of military restraint appeals to the German public. This, after all, was an approach that proved successful for his role model, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, an FDP politician who was Germany's longest-serving foreign minister and vice chancellor. That, though, was during the last century, when there was no expectation abroad that Germany would take part in military operations.
Now, such a message, as practiced by Westerwelle, calls forth a very different reaction among Germany's allies -- which explains why Defense Minister de Maizière is seeking to broadcast a different message. Back in June 2011, he said that Germany could not claim a special role for itself. Those who had more, he said, had to "also assume a greater responsibility, even militarily.""
"During a closed-door meeting of Nato defence ministers, Mr Gates specifically named Germany and Poland as two countries with the capabilities to assist in the air war who were currently not contributing at all."
"US officials are particularly concerned that a significant portion of the ground campaign is being borne by Canada and three “smaller European countries”: Belgium, Denmark and Norway."
"AAlthough the German contingent is the third biggest in Afghanistan, its engagement in combat operations against the Taleban is rather small. The government has limited the Bundeswehr's activity to non-military operations in the relatively quiet northern provinces of Afghanistan and prefers engagement in reconstruction and development aid. One of the reasons for that is the German public opinion's negative perception of the Bundeswehr's military missions for historical reasons. The German policy is unlikely to change, especially considering the approaching parliamentary elections next autumn and the diminishing consensus over the engagement in Afghanistan among the political elite. Germany expects that the USA will treat its European allies' views regarding security issues with greater respect and at the same time is not ready to incur an equal share of the military costs as part of NATO. Therefore the mission in Afghanistan may become a problem in future relations between Germany and the USA."
"Germany – Europe’s central power – is both crucial and problematic in such calculations. With France weakened and Britain marginalised, the tighter and more coercive EU that is emerging from the crisis is one based to a growing degree on German preferences. Obama is extremely popular in Germany, but Berlin’s deeply-held views on the use of military force – and its increasingly close relationship with China – have the potential to create a Europe-America split.
Speaking last year, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that NATO is turning into a “two-tiered alliance,” one divided between “those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitment” and “those who enjoy the benefits of NATO […] but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.” In particular, Gates criticised those members of the alliance that spend under the agreed 2 percent of GDP on defense. He did not name Germany – which spends just 1.3 percent of GDP on defense – but undoubtedly had it in mind. Germany’s austerity-led approach to the euro crisis, meanwhile, is exacerbating defence budget cuts in other EU member states."
"Other Germans seem simply to think that they can leave security to others in Europe, such as Britain and France."